REGIONAL WASTEWATER UTILITY RESPONSE AND RECOVERY FROM HURRICANE SANDY



OCEAN COUNTY UTILITIES AUTHORITY

Presented By:

Keith B. Marcoon, P.E.

Manager, Engineering & Construction

Ocean County Utilities Authority

OCEAN COUNTY UTILITIES AUTHORITY

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Technology Transfer Seminar
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Eatontown, NJ

Acknowledgements

- Fred Auermuller, Director, OCUA
 Central Division
- Countless other operations, maintenance, electricians, mechanics, engineers, managers, and administrative staff
- Contractors, consultants, service providers
- Emergency response, various agencies

REGIONAL WASTEWATER UTILITY RESPONSE AND RECOVERY FROM HURRICANE SANDY

Ocean County Utilities Authority (OCUA) Service Territory

- Ocean County and Southern Monmouth County
- 37 municipal and private/governmental participants
- Approximately 600,000 people served

Ocean County = Tourism = Water Quality







3 Secondary Wastewater Treatment Plants

- 40 Pump Stations
- 160 Miles of Interceptor
- 11 Miles of Barnegat Bay Crossings
- 4 Miles of Atlantic Ocean Outfalls

Northern Water Pollution Control Facility

- Brick Twp.
 - Design

 Capacity
 32 mgd

 Annual

 Average Daily
 Flow (AADF)

2012 AADF21.4 mgd



Central Water Pollution Control Facility

- Bayville, Berkeley Twp.
 - DesignCapacity= 32 mgdAADF

2012 AADF20.8 mgd




Southern Water Pollution Control Facility


- Stafford Twp.
 - DesignCapacity= 20 mgdAADF
 - 2012 AADF7.2 mgd



OCUA Central Service Area



NWPCF, Effluent Outfall: Bay Crossing, Ocean Diffusers



Pre-Storm Preparations

- Previous storm flooding in NJ:
 - Annual Nor'easters
 - Hurricane Irene
 - October 1991 "Frankenstorm" (the perfect storm)
 - December 1992 Nor'easter widespread flooding
- Personnel and shift planning, food, water
- Trucks and drivers on-call or on-site (sludge)
- Review and Distribute Emergency Contacts
- FUEL ... PUMPS ... GENERATORS

Pre-Storm Preparations

- Secure loose items from high winds
- Top off fuel and Hypo tanks
- Shutdown islandarea stations odor control and chemical feed systems



CPS-18 Wrangle Brook Lift Station Transformer (Toms River)

Pre-Storm Preparations

Meetings begin about October 24

Thursday,
 October
 25th: NHC
 projects
 "Left-Turn"



What Happened?

- October 29, 2012:
- Two additional Nor'easters
- 2nd Costliest Hurricane in US History
- 32 foot high waves off Sandy Hook
- 89 mph wind gusts Surf City
- Immense Storm Surge

Before / After (Ortley Beach, Toms River Township)



Ortley Beach, Toms River Township








Before / After

(Seaside Heights Amusement Pier)







Before / After (Mantoloking Bridge)



Mantoloking Bridge / North Barrier Island Breach



Mantoloking Borough



NWPCF Ocean Outfall Manhole, Mantoloking

Before Sandy

After Sandy





NWPCF Ocean Outfall Manhole, Mantoloking

December 13, 1992 Nor'easter




What Happened To OCUA?

- Minimal damage/impact to all three WWTPs
- Flooding close to NWPCF property
- 27 of 40 pump/lift stations damaged
 - Average \$108,000 per station
 - Almost \$3.0 Million in damages
 - Bayhead to Beach Haven
- Several stations out of operation
- 22 Metering and 16 Cathodic Protection Stations impacted

What Happened To OCUA?

- Typical Pump/Lift Station damages:
 - Pump Rebuilds/Rehab bearings, mech.
 seals
 - Electric Motors: Dimminutors, screw pump
 - Light fixtures, receptacles
 - Circuit Breakers, Contactors, Starters
 - Control Panels
 - Valve and gate actuators
 - Metering equipment
 - Conduit/Wire


OCUA Central Service Area




OCUA Central Service Area



O.C.U.A. 2012 Plant Influent Flow



What Happened to OCUA? SCADA system analysis: 10/28 through 11/1



SCADA system analysis: 10/28 through 11/1

 10/29/12, 8:00 pm: CPS-19 lost pumping capacity last recorded flow = 12 + mgd

- 10/30/12, 2:00 am:
 - CWPCF influent flows maxed at ~50 mgd
 - CWPCF Effluent EQ Basin gates opened to buffer peak influent flow


What IF?



CPS-2 Lift Station, Seaside Heights

Screw Pump Motors in wet well, one removed pre-storm

CPS-2 Lift Station, Seaside Heights





CPS-17 Lift Station, Brick Bayway - Island Region


Screw Pump wet well

CPS-19 Pump Station, Ortley Beach

Dry Well (Pump Room) fully submerged



CPS-19 Ortley Beach P.S. Flooded Areas



CPS-19 Pump
Station, Ortley
Beach

- Subgrade Motor Room, at sea level (+/_)
- 4 centrifugal pump motors: 100 hp -125 hp
- Motor Control Centers
- Distribution Panels
- Switchgear
- Control Panels
- Flomatcher controls



CPS-19 Pump Station, Ortley Beach

Damaged
Electrical
Control
Panels,
Breakers, etc.




CPS-19 Pump Station, Ortley Beach

Unsealed conduits from station exterior and from upstairs generator room

sources of dry well flooding



CPS-1 Lavallette Pump Station



Damaged Equipment









Vapor Phase GAC unit shifted



Collection System Conditions





WHY did this happen?

- Most wet wells flooded due to extreme flows, compromised collection systems
- Wet wells impacted Dry wells
 - Unsealed wall penetrations, conduits
 - Sump pump check valves
- Limited overland flow above first floor into stations
 - CPS-19 Ortley: FF elevation= 8.50 (1929 N.G.V.D.)
 - CPS-19 Dry well water level = -4.5 ft. (1929 N.G.V.D.)

WHY did this happen?

Commercial power failures

- Standby Generator failures
 - Fuel supplies
 - High temperature alarms
 - Radiator Cooling water supply failed
 - First time local water supply failed in 30+ years
 - No power to run private wells

WHAT did we do?

- Form small initial assessment teams
 - Operations
 - Maintenance
 - Electricians
 - Engineers
- Prioritize Locations
- Evaluate Needs
- Evaluate Available Resources

- Operational status updates
 - Restore at least one pump at each station
 - Coordination
 - Communication
- Update to NJDEP and other agencies, NJOEM, NJSP
- Agency resource coordination:
 - Generators
 - Fuel

CPS-1 Lavallette Pump Station Clean-up efforts



CPS-1 Lavallette
Pump Station
Clean-up efforts

Date: 11/4/12



CPS-1 Lavallette Pump Station



 REPAIR and RESTORE to pre-Sandy condition

- Procure and Install
- Major repairs contracts to be advertised
- Simple steps:
 - seal penetrations
 - closed loop radiators on roof
 - Secure loose items...
 - Check valve operation

- Insurance Claim
- FEMA Claim

- Future Mitigation Steps ???
- Standby generator reliability
 - Water sources
 - Closed-loop radiators
 - Fuel Deliveries, staging
- Portable generator purchase Trailers
- Bypass pumping equipment
- Submersible pumps

- Stock spare motors, equipment
- Vulnerable pump stations:
 - Raise electrical equipment to above grade
 (Losses vs. Mitigation Cost vs. Public Impacts)
 - Flood proofing?
- Remove threatened equipment pre-storm
 - Metering panels
- Flow Isolation and Operational Status ???

- FEMA Advisory Base Flood Elevations
 - First Floor Elevations vs. ABFE

 Approximately ½ of damaged stations first floor are below ABFE "1%" elevation

- Evaluate Capital Plan, Budgets, FEMA and Financing Options
- Another SANDY ???

